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I. INTRODUCTION
Jackie and her family decided to cool off at the local lake last summer during
one of the many sweltering days when the temperature was over 100 degrees. Early
in the morning, they loaded up the jet skis and headed off. Later, while enjoying her
day on the lake, Jackie jumped off her jet ski for a dip in the cool water.
Unfortunately, Jackie and her family did not realize how dangerously close they
were to the dam, a federally funded public works project having flood control as
one of its purposes. There had been no signs or buoys marking the point beyond
which skiing would be dangerous. The federal employees working at the dam that
morning had forgotten to put out the buoys. Unfortunately, because water was being
released from the lake for irrigation purposes, Jackie was sucked into the gates of
the dam. Her dad jumped in to try to pull her back, but the suction from the dam
was too strong. Neither Jackie nor her father made it out alive. Despite the fact that
Jackie's mother appears to have a valid wrongful death claim against the federal
government under the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA),' she might never get her
day in court due to a broad immunity the government enjoys under § 702c of the
Flood Control Act of 1928 (FCA).2
Section 702c of the FCA provides that "[n]o liability of any kind shall attach
to or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or flood waters
at any place." This Comment will argue that modem recognition of § 702c creates
injustice on two levels. First, on a general level, the broad sovereign immunity
recognized under that provision is inconsistent with the FTCA. When Congress
passed the FTCA eighteen years after it passed the FCA, it made a policy decision
1. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2671-2680 (West 1994); see infra Part II.B (explaining the
history behind the FTCA, which allows tort claims to be brought by private citizens against the federal
government).
2. Flood Control Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 702c (West 1986). The fact pattern described is a hypothetical
situation, based loosely on United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597 (1986), which held that § 702c of the Flood
Control Act immunized the government from a wrongful death claim on essentially the same facts. See infra Part
IV (discussing the facts of James and illustrating how the protection of § 702c was applied to those facts).
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to waive sovereign immunity in the area of tort claims Despite Congress' intent
to waive immunity in the governmental tort context, the judiciary continues to
recognize under § 702c an absolute immunity that bars otherwise-legitimate claims
for "personal injury and death caused by federal negligence, gross negligence, and
even 'conscious governmental indifference to the safety of the public."'
4
Secondly, even if a sound policy reason exists for continuing to recognize
§ 702c immunity,5 the federal circuit courts apply the immunity provision so
inconsistently that a more specific inequity has been created.6 A plaintiff's ability
to withstand a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over a tort claim connected
to government flood control projects depends on the circuit in which the suit arises.7
The inconsistency occurs because each circuit utilizes its own test for determining
the facts to which the immunity provision will apply.8 Furthermore, the U.S.
Supreme Court has not only failed to resolve the inconsistency, but has added to the
confusion with its opinion in United States v. James,9 the only case the Court has
decided regarding § 702c immunity questions.10 As this Comment will demonstrate,
either congressional action or reinterpretation of § 702c by the Supreme Court is
urgently needed. This Comment will suggest that Congress should amend the FTCA
to make clear that it was intended to repeal § 702c in favor of the "discretionary
function" exception." In the absence of such congressional action, the inequity
created by modem interpretations of § 702c demands that the Supreme Court
narrowly construe the statute. A narrow interpretation will limit its application to
those situations in which immunity is necessary to encourage future funding of
flood control projects.' 2 Such a narrow interpretation by the Supreme Court would
also provide a consistent test for the circuit courts to use when determining whether
3. See infra Part II.C (explaining the policy behind the passage of the FTCA).
4. Hiersche v. United States, 503 U.S. 923, 924 (1992) (quoting United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597,
600 (1986)) (acknowledging that after United States v. James, § 702c provides a complete defense against these
types of claims).
5. Noticeably, no such special immunity is recognized in other public works contexts.
6. See infra Part BI (describing the different tests used by the various circuit courts, and how each test
results in an inconsistent application of the immunity provision).
7. See infra Part L.A (discussing how some circuit courts use § 702c to provide a broad-based immunity,
and how others give it a narrow application for policy reasons).
8. See infra Part ME (explaining the splits between the circuit courts over the proper scope of § 702c).
9. 478 U.S. 597 (1986).
10. See infra Part IV.D (describing how the Court's opinion in United States v. James not only failed to
resolve the split between the circuits, but also created a new split through its use of overly broad language).
11. See infra Part V (suggesting that the FTCA canprovide the necessary protection for governmental anti-
flooding activities for which § 702c was originally enacted to provide).
12. See infra Part VI (arguing that, due to the injustice created by the unequal use of the immunity
provision among the circuits, the Supreme Court should narrowly interpret § 702c so as to limit it to the situations
wherein the policy supporting it is implicated).
1999 /The Immunity Provision of the Flood Control Act
the immunity applies. Thus, reinterpretation of § 702c by the Supreme Court would,
at least in part, alleviate both levels of inequity created by § 702c.1
3
In Part II, this Comment discusses the legislative history of the FCA and
illustrates how modem recognition of a broad immunity is inconsistent with the
policy behind the enactment of the FTCA.14 Part DI analyzes the judicial treatment
of § 702c of the FCA, and describes the original disagreement between the circuits
over the proper interpretation of that section.t5 Part IV illustrates how the Supreme
Court's ruling in United States v. James16 failed to resolve the original circuit split,
and created the basis for some circuits to expand the scope of the immunity to its
outermost limits.17 Part V explains the role of the "discretionary function" exception
to the FTCA, and proposes that the necessary protection for governmental anti-
flooding activities be determined under that provision. 8 Part VI concludes by
suggesting a resolution to that conflict through a narrow Supreme Court
interpretation of the FCA.' 9
II. THE FLOOD CONTROL Acr AND THE FEDERAL
TORT CLAIMS ACr
A. The Historical Background of the 1928 Flood Control Act
In 1927, a massive flood left the Mississippi River Valley area economically
devastated.20 In response, Congress began debating the possibility of funding a
flood control project for that region in order to prevent such disasters in the future.2'
The project was one of the largest and most expensive federally funded public
works programs to date in the United States.22 Due to the expense of the intended
project, however, Congress was concerned with the need to limit any potential
liability of the federal government that might result from such an immense flood
control project.'
13. See infra Part V (concluding that because of the inequities created by the current use of the FCA
immunity provision, it should be repealed, amended, or narrowed by either Congress or the Supreme Court),
14. See infra Part I (explainifig the reasons for the 1928 Flood Control Act and its immunity provision).
15. fnfra Part ll.
16. 478 U.S. 597 (1986).
17. Infra Part IV.
18. Infra Part V.
19. See infra Part VI (asserting that in the absence of congressional action, the immunity provision of the
FCA should be narrowly interpreted to apply only when the policy reasons supporting the need for the immunity
are implicated).
20. United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 606 (citing S. REP. No. 70-619, at 12 (1928)).
21. ld. (citing S. REP. No. 70-619, at 12 (1928)).
22. See idL (citing 6640 CONG. REC. (1928)) (noting that the flood control project would "cost four times
as much as the Panama Canal").
23. See id. at 607 (asserting that Congress must have been concerned with limiting governmental spending
on flood control because of the magnitude of the contemplated project, and therefore intended to limit the
government's liabilities to direct expenditures on the project).
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Congress debated over the Mississippi River Valley Flood Control Act from
February to May 1928.24 The possibility of an immunity provision was not
introduced until the end of the debate?2 Little legislative history exists regarding
the immunity provision.2 Due to this scarcity of direct legislative history, the courts
were forced to develop their own interpretation of the intent behind § 702c.27 Some
legislators thought the provision was unnecessary because, at the time of the debate,
the federal government still operated under the common law sovereign immunity
doctrine.28 At common law, unless the federal government consented to being sued,
it was immune from all liability.29 Nonetheless, most congressional members were
concerned that if the federal government were to undertake the duty of flood
control, it would be liable for any damage that may occur when a flood control
project fails to control a flood. ° In order to quash those fears and encourage future
funding of other necessary flood control projects,3' Congress included the immunity
provision in the final version of the FCA 2
Although the FCA was only enacted to provide flood control in the Mississippi
River Valley, the limited immunity provided in § 702c has been extended to apply
24. Id. at 606.
25. See Graci v. United States, 456 F.2d 20, 23 (5th Cir. 1971) ("The immunity provision was not
introduced into the flood control bill until shortly before the final version of the bill was enacted into law.").
26. See id. (finding that the legislative history of the adoption of the immunity provision is "unrevealing,"
and such adoption was done with "little or no discussion").
27. See James, 478 U.S. at 607 (remarking that statements made during the debate support the majority's
interpretation of the intent behind § 702c); see also id. at 614 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding that "neither the
plain language of the statute nor the legislative history behind it supports" the majority view); see generally Sarah
Juvan, Note, The Federal Flood Control Act: Congressional Development of a Modern-Day Ark, 44 DRAKE. L.
REv. 303 (1996) (discussing the varying interpretations given by different courts of the intent behind § 702c).
28. See James, 478 U.S. at 608 (citing 69 CONG. REc. 7028 (1928)) ("While it is wise to insert that
provision in the bill, it is not necessary, because the Supreme Court of the United States has decided ... that the
Government is not liable for any [tort] damages.').
29. See infra Part lI.B (describing the doctrine of sovereign immunity).
30. See Guy F. Atkinson Co. v. Merritt, Chapman, & Scott Corp., 126 F. Supp. 406,408 (N.D. Cal. 1954)
(finding that the purpose of § 702c was to ensure that the government would not be liable for future flood damage
just because it took on a project of controlling floods; it could not control all floods which were bound to occur).
31. See Graci, 456 F.2d at 26 ("'[I]mmunity from liability for flood water damage arising in connection
with flood control works was the condition upon which the government decided to enter into the area of
nationwide flood control programs."' (quoting Graci v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 947, 952 (1969))); National
Mfg. Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 263, 271 (8th Cir. 1954) (finding that "absolute freedom of the government
from liability for flood damages is and has been a factor of the greatest importance in the extent to which
[C]ongress has been and is willing to make appropriations for flood control and to engage in costly undertakings
to reduce flood damage").
3Z. See Peterson v. United States, 367 F.2d 271,275-76 (9th Cir. 1966)
([I]t is clear that Congress intended by the enactment of § 702c in the Act of May 15, 1928.... to be
an integral part of a plan or policy on the part of the Government to embark on a vast construction
program to prevent or minimize the incidences of loss occurring from floods and flood waters by the
building of dikes, dams, levees, and related works, and to keep the Government entirely free from
liability for damages when loss occurs, notwithstanding the works undertaken by the Government to
minimize it.).
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to all federally funded flood control projects.33 Furthermore, some modem
interpretations of § 702c provide absolute immunity for claims of negligent and
intentional tortious acts committed by federal employees working at any public
works project with flood control as one of its purposes. 4 Thus, immunity is applied
regardless of whether a flood or flood control activity was the cause of such
damage.
35
The Congress of 1928 could not have anticipated the breadth or types of
projects to be built in the "power generation. 36 Today, public works projects are
built for many reasons, flood control being just one of them.37 These projects
commonly combine flood control, recreation, and conservation purposes. 38 Thus,
the 1928 Congress could not have intended § 702c to immunize the government
from claims of personal injury and death by recreational users of a public works
project that happens to have flood control as one of its many purposes.39
B. The Federal Tort Claims Act and Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity
The doctrine of sovereign immunity originated at English common law.40 Under
this doctrine, the sovereign could not be sued without its consent, because "the King
could do no wrong." t Because this concept was part of the common law before the
ratification of the Constitution, the judiciary adopted the doctrine into the new
American common law.42 Despite that adoption, the doctrine of sovereign immunity
could not rest on the idea that "the King could do no wrong. 43 Instead, the modem
recognition of sovereign immunity in America is usually justified as necessary to
33. See National Mfg., 210 F.2d at 274 (holding that use of the words "at any place" implies that Congress
intended the immunity under § 702c to apply to all flood damage, not just that on the Mississippi River).
34. See Hiersche v. United States, 503 U.S. 923,926 (1992) (discussing the injustice created by continued
recognition of immunity under § 702c due to the changed circumstances since its adoption).
35. Id.
36. See id. at 925 (discussing the different purposes for which public works projects are built today, as
compared to 1928, when § 702c was passed).
37. Id
38. Id.
39. See id. at 926 ("Today this obsolete legislative remnant is nothing more than an engine of injustice.").
40. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410,414 (1978) (acknowledging the doctrine's roots in the English feudal
system).
41. See id. at 415 (quoting 1 WILLIAMBLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *246) ("The King, moreover, is not
only incapable of doing wrong, but even thinking wrong; he can never mean to do an improper thing.").
42. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 31 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part), overruled on other grounds by Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (noting the
Court's observation in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), that the doctrine still applied because sovereign
immunity "was part of the understood background against which the Constitution was adopted, and which its
jurisdictional provisions did not mean to sweep away").
43. See Hall, 440 U.S. at 415 (recognizing the historical reasoning for sovereign immunity, but rejecting
the notion that wrongs could not be committed by a sovereign).
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ensure that the government can operate effectively." The government cannot run
efficiently if people can sue it for every wrong inflicted during a necessary
governmental function. 45 If that were possible, the government would not have
enough money to do the things a government is formed to do." For many people,
though, this was still not enough to justify complete federal immunity from liability
for damage caused by a government employee.47
Many viewed absolute sovereign immunity as contrary to the American
democratic notion of accountability." In recognition of that view, Congress passed
the FTCA, waiving sovereign immunity with respect to private tort claims against
the federal government. 9
C. The Policy Behind the Federal Tort Claims Act
In 1946, Congress passed the Legislative Reorganization Act.5 Title IV of that
Act, commonly known as the FTCA, waived sovereign immunity in the realm of
tort claims against government agents.5' The FTCA provides that the federal
government is liable "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances" for the torts of its employees.5 2 Prior to the
passage of the FrCA, the only redress for people damaged by the tortious conduct
of government employees was to petition Congress to pass a bill to provide for the
private relief of the petitioner.53
The use of the private bill system to provide relief for private tort victims was
inefficient.-s That inefficiency forced Congress to recognize the need for a more
44. See Gibbons v. United States, 75 U.S. 269,275 (1865) (finding that sovereign immunity is necessary
because the government should not be liable for torts which occur when employees are engaged in their "official
duties").
45. Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516 (1899).
46. Il
47. See, e.g., C. Jacobs, TiiEELEvENTHAmENDmENTANDSOVEEIGNIMMUNrrY 153 (1972) (stating that
the application of sovereign immunity hinders the "performance of one of the most essential government
functions, the dispensation ofjustice according to law').
48. See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573, 580 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) ("[Immunity] is an anachronistic survival of monarchical privilege, and runs counter to democratic
notions of moral responsibility of the State.").
49. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15,24 (1953).
50. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2671-2680 (West 1994).
51. Jd. at 24-25.
52. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2674 (West 1994).
53. Holtzoff, The Handling of Tort Claims Against the Federal Government, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
311,322 (1942).
54. See Daehite, 346 U.S. at 24,25 & n.9 (1953) (stating that the old system was "notoriously clumsy,"
and citing the increasing number of private bills which were introduced in Congress, yet never discussed than the
private bill system).
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effective way to redress the claims of the victims of governmental torts,55 which
were increasing in number as the government increased in size. 6 Subjecting the
government to civil liability for its own torts provided the best way for victims to
obtain the necessary relief. Furthermore, by enacting the FTCA, Congress
acknowledged that absolute sovereign immunity was contrary to modem notions
of democracy.57 "The Government should assume the obligation to pay damages for
the misfeasance of employees in carrying out its work."
58
Despite the waiver of sovereign immunity in the tort context under the FTCA,
the judiciary continues to recognize an absolute immunity in § 702c. 59 That
immunity has been interpreted to apply to tortious acts committed by federal
employees of a public works project having flood control as one of its purposes.6t
The continued recognition of such a broad immunity under § 702c, despite the
subsequent enactment of the FTCA, becomes significant given the fact that
immunity for flood control activities was contemplated during the debate over the
FTCA's discretionary function exception.6' Moreover, the inequity created by the
broad modem interpretation of § 702c is glaringly inconsistent with the policy
behind the FTCA: waiving sovereign immunity in the tort arena so as to make the
government accountable for its own wrongs.62
III. EARLY JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE FCA
IMMUNrrY PROVISION
After Congress passed the FTCA in 1946, plaintiffs began suing the
government for damages caused by negligent failures to warn of floods, or by
negligent construction, maintenance, or design of flood control projects which
resulted in flooding and property damage.63 As a defense to these suits, the
55. Id at 24-25 (explaining that the FrCA arose out of a recognition that the government should be liable
for damage caused by its employees, and thus, providing access to the courts for redress of such claims was a
better way to provide the necessary relief).
56. Michael S. Levine, Note, United States v. James: Expanding the Scope of Sovereign Immunity for
Federal Flood ControlActivities, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 219,222-23 (1987).
57. Id. at 219.
58. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 24.
59. See infra Part IV.E (discussing the various circuit court interpretations of § 702c and how each circuit
recognizes a broad-based immunity).
60. Supra note 32 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 211-12 (citing language from the Attorney General discussing the discretionary function
exception, which contemplates immunity for flood control activities).
62. Supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., Clark v. United States, 218 F.2d 446,448 (9th Cir. 1954) (asserting a claim under FTCA by
alleging that construction and maintenance of a federal dam on the Columbia River caused the dam to break and
flood the plaintiff's property); National Mfg. Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 263, 269, 274 (8th Cir. 1954)
(dismissing an action under the FrCA alleging that plaintiffs were injured when they were lulled into a false sense
of safety due to the government's negligent failure to warn of an impending flood); Guy F. Atkinson Co. v.
Merritt, Chapman, & Scott Corp., 126 F. Supp. 406,407-08 (N.D. Cal. 1954) (discussing plaintiff's FTCA claim
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government raised § 702c of the FCA, arguing that it had not been repealed by the
subsequent passage of the FrCA.64
For the most part, the federal circuit courts were in agreement that § 702c
remained a valid defense and that the government must make a certain threshold
showing in order to invoke the protection of § 702c. The government had to prove
two elements: (1) that the flood or flood waters that had damaged the plaintiff were
connected to a federally funded flood control project; and (2) that the damage was
caused in part or in full by a flood or flood waters.65
The circuit courts required the first element because the immunity provision
was enacted as part of a federal bill authorizing the funding of a flood control
project.66 Hence, for the plaintiff to legitimately raise the issue of immunity under
§ 702c, the flood must have been connected to a federally funded flood control
project.67 Also, because the courts interpreted the policy behind § 702c to be aimed
at providing the government with enough protection from potential flood liability
to encourage the future funding of such necessary projects, the immunity would
only apply when the flood or flood waters that had damaged the plaintiff had been
connected to a flood control project.6' As for the second element, the language of
the provision itself required that the damage be caused by "floods or flood
waters."69
alleging that the negligent construction of the federally funded Folsom Dam caused his downstream construction
site to be inundated with water, thus damaging his property).
64. See Clark, 218 F.2d at 452 (1954) (holding that § 702c barred recovery under these facts); National
Mfg., 210 F.2d at 274 (applying the protection of § 702c to bar the plaintiffs' FTCA claim). But see Guy E
Atkinson, 126 F Supp. at 409-10 (finding that the government was not entitled to summary judgment because it
had not proven that the flood that damaged the plaintiff was of the type intended to be protected under § 702c).
65. See Portis v. Folk Constr. Co., 694 F.2d 520,522-23 (8th Cir. 1982) (asserting that the determination
of whether immunity applied rested on two separate issues: whether the structure in question "was a 'flood
control' project for purposes of... § 702c .... [and] whether 'flooding' within the meaning of that statute
occurred"); Morici Corp. v. United States, 681 F.2d 645, 648 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Since in this case the project was
authorized by Congress for flood control purposes, and the flooding was related to use of that project, the
immunity continues to attach."); Florida E. Coast Ry. Co. v. United States, 519 F.2d 1184, 1191 (5th Cir. 1975)
("Mhe United States is protected from liability for damages caused by 'floods or flood waters' in connection with
flood control projects, even when the government's own negligence has caused or aggravated the losses.').
66. See National Mfg., 210 F.2d at 270-71 ( [W]hen Congress entered upon flood control on the great scale
contemplated by the [Flood Control] Act it safeguarded the United States against liability of any kind for damage
from or by floods or flood waters .... ").
67. See Peterson v. United States, 367 F.2d 271,275 (9th Cir. 1966) (refusing to apply the protection of
§ 702c because the flooding that had damaged the plaintiff was "wholly unrelated to any Act of Congress
authorizing expenditures of federal funds for flood control"). But see National Mfg., 210 F.2d at 271 (holding that
the government is immune from paying for damage caused by floods or flood waters at any place, "in spite of and
notwithstanding federal flood control works").
68. See National Mfg., 210 F.2d at 271 (expressing "that absolute freedom of the government from liability
for flood damages is and has been a factor of the greatest importance in the extent to which Congress has been
and is willing to make appropriations for flood control and to engage in costly undertakings to reduce flood
damage").
69. See Flood Control Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 702c (West 1999) ("No liability of any kind shall attach to or
rest upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place .... ").
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A. The Circuits Split over the First Element: How Much of a Nexus is Needed?
Although the circuits agreed that a connection needed to exist between the flood
or flood waters and a federally authorized flood control project, 70 they disagreed as
to the type of nexus necessary to invoke the protection of the provision.71 The
disagreement becomes significant when determining the proper scope of the
immunity provision: today, public works projects are used not only for flood
control, but also to create hydroelectric power and to create lakes for recreation and
conservation.72 Thus, if a tight nexus is required, the government has to show that
the damage was caused by the project being used specifically for flood control.73 On
the other hand, a broad nexus requirement is satisfied when the public works project
has flood control as one of its purposes.74 All of the circuit courts did agree,
however, that if the negligent conduct is "wholly unrelated" to a federally funded
project having flood control as one of its purposes, that conduct will not be
protected under § 702c and the government therefore could be liable for any
damage caused by its negligence.75
1. The Broad Nexus Requirement
All the circuit courts agreed that a flood "wholly unrelated" to a federally
funded flood control project was not protected under § 702c.76 On the other hand,
some of the circuit courts broadly held that as long as an injury had not been
"wholly unrelated" to a federally funded public works project having flood control
70. Although National Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 1210 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1954), broadly
construed § 702c to immunize the government against liability for any flood damage notwithstanding a flood
control project, no other court has agreed with that interpretation. See Levine, supra note 56 at 231 (stating that
the broad scope under National Manufacturing has been limited by subsequent interpretations).
71. See, e.g., Washington v. East Colum. Basin Irrigation Dist., 105 F.3d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1997)
(discussing the difference between the Fourth Circuit nexus requirement and that of the Ninth Circuit, and
adopting its own as the proper standard despite any claims that United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597 (1986), had
resolved the conflict).
72. Hiersche v. United States, 503 U.S. 923, 925 (1992).
73. See infra Part llI.A.2 (discussing the standard under the Hayes nexus requirement).
74. See infra Part lI.A.1 (explaining the broad nexus standard requirements).
75. See Hayes v. United States, 585 F.2d 701,702 (4th Cir. 1978) (agreeing with Graci v. United States,
456 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1971), and stating that no immunity attaches "for flooding caused by a federal project
unrelated to flood control"); Graci v. United States, 456 F.2d 20, 26-27 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that because the
federal project, which allegedly caused the flooding that had damaged the plaintiff, was built for navigational
purposes as opposed to flood control purposes, the protection of § 702c did not attach and the government was
open to suit under an FrCA claim); see also Peterson v. United States, 367 F.2d 271,275 (9th Cir. 1966) (finding
that no immunity applied where the decision to blast an ice jam which caused flooding downstream was wholly
unrelated to a congressional act authorizing a flood control project); Parks v. United States, 370 F.2d 92, 93 (2nd
Cir. 1966) (adopting the rule of Peterson that flood damage wholly unrelated to flood control projects is not
protected by 702c).
76. Supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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as one of its purposes, the immunity would apply.77 Hence, as long as flood control
had been at least one of the reasons the federal project had been built, these circuits
will apply the immunity provision, even if it was not a flood control activity that
had caused the flooding.7 "It is the relationship between the flooding and a project
[c]ongressionally authorized for flood control which is the controlling factor" under
this nexus test, not whether an actual anti-flooding activity caused the flooding.79
For example, the collapse of the Teton Dam in 1976 caused severe flooding
throughout Idaho's Teton Basin.80 The legislation that enabled the construction of
the Teton dam listed multiple purposes for the project, but flood control was not
among them.8' Despite that fact, the appellate court held that the immunity
provision in § 702c applied, thereby barring the plaintiffs suit because it found that
"flood control was on the minds of the members of Congress when passing the
legislation. 82 If the legislative intent behind § 702c indeed had been to make sure
the government would not be liable for its specific anti-flooding activities, this test
seems inconsistent with that narrow intent requirement.
2. The Fourth Circuit Requires a Tighter Nexus
In Hayes v. United States,83 the Fourth Circuit found the "not wholly unrelated"
standard, discussed above,8' to be too broad.85 The court was concerned that such
a broad application of § 702c immunity was contrary to congressional intent,
especially after the enactment of the FTCA,86 which expressed a policy
disapproving of sovereign immunity in the realm of tort claims.87 Because the
purpose of the immunity provision was to protect the government from extensive
liability arising out of its flood control activities, the immunity should only apply
77. Supra note 75 and accompanying text.
78. See Morici Corp. v. United States, 681 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding that even if the project were
being operated for a purpose other than flood control at the time of the negligence, the immunity would still attach
because the conduct had been "not wholly unrelated" to a project with flood control as one of its purposes).
79. Id. at 648.
80. Aetna Ins. Co. v. United States, 628 F.2d 1201, 1203 (9th Cir. 1980).
81. Id
82. See id. (discussing the comments relating to flood control made by members of Congress during the
debate over the Teton Dam project, and finding that "flood control was beyond question a purpose of the project";
thus, § 702c immunity would apply).
83. 585 F.2d 701 (4th Cir. 1978).
84. Supra Part El.A.1.
85. See Hayes, 585 F.2d at 704 (holding that the trial court erred when it dismissed the plaintiffs claim
on a summary judgment motion because the plaintiff had offered evidence showing that some of the waterreleased
by the public works project which flooded his property had been released for a non-flood control purpose; if that
were found to be true, then § 702c would not apply).
86. See id at 702 (explaining that after the enactment of the FrCA, the use of § 702c immunity should be
confined to damage specifically caused by federal flood control activities).
87. See infra Part H.B (explaining the policy behind the enactment of the FrCA).
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to conduct in furtherance of anti-flooding activity.88 Therefore, in Hayes, the Fourth
Circuit determined that a tighter nexus between the negligent conduct and the flood
control project needed to be shown before the government could claim immunity
under § 702c.89
Under this standard, if the plaintiff's damage had been caused by the operation
of the public works project for a non-flood control purpose, although flood control
may have been one of the general purposes of the project, then § 702c would not
apply, and the government would still be held liable.90 However, if the government
could prove that the plaintiff's damage had been caused when the project was
specifically being used for the purpose of flood control, then the immunity
provision would still apply.91 Thus, the appellate court remanded the case to the trial
court, which had dismissed the case on summary judgment in favor of the
government due to the government's claim of immunity under § 702c.92 The trial
court was instructed to make a fact-sensitive determination, and if it found that
some of the waters that damaged the plaintiff had been released for purposes other
than flood control, the immunity was not to apply.93
On the other hand, under the "not wholly unrelated" standard, as long as the
government conduct had been related to a project which had flood control as one
of its purposes, the conduct was protected, regardless of whether the specific
conduct had been related to flood control.' A determination under the Fourth
Circuit standard becomes very fact sensitive, because the court scrutinizes each case
to determine whether, under the particular facts, the plaintiff's damage had actually
been caused by a federally funded flood control activity, rather than simply
determining whether flood control had been one of the project's general purposes.95
Although the Fourth Circuit has not had another occasion to employ this fact-
sensitive determination, the "not wholly unrelated" circuits are fully aware of and
continue to acknowledge the split the Fourth Circuit created.96 Furthermore, the
latter circuits criticize the Hayes standard as being contrary to the broad language
88. Hayes, 585 F.2d at 702.
89. See l at 703 (reversing the grant of summary judgment for the government on the basis of § 702c
immunity because the government had not shown that the project was being specifically used for a flood control
activity when the plaintiff's land was flooded by water negligefitly released by that project).
90. See Hayes, 585 F.2d at 702-03 ("If the plaintiff could prove damage to his farm as a result of the dam's
operation as a recreational facility without relation to the operation of the dam as a flood control project, he would
avoid the absolute bar of § 702c").
91. lad
92. Id. at 703.
93. Id.
94. See supra Part Mll.A.1 (explaining that some of the circuit courts only required a tenuous connection
between the plaintiff's damage and a federally authorized flood control project).
95. See Hayes, 585 F.2d at 702-03 (remanding the case to the trial court to make the fact-sensitive
determination of whether the plaintiff's damage was actually caused by a flood control activity before deciding
if § 702c was to apply).
96. Morici Corp., 681 F.2d at 647.
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used in the immunity provision and for making the government's burden of proof
too difficult to carry.97
B. "Damage from or by Floods or Flood Waters"
All of the circuit courts agreed that once the government proved the requisite
nexus, whichever nexus that may be, it would also have to prove a second
element: that "floods or flood waters," as understood under § 702c, had damaged
the plaintiff.98 The language of the provision itself states the immunity only
protected the government from liability for "damage from or by floods or flood
waters." 99 Section 702c was not intended to protect the government from every
conceivable type of water damage; instead, it was created to protect the government
from liability for damage resulting from "events properly described as floods. ''""u
The earlier courts deciding this issue declared that the 1928 Congress had only
intended a "natural" or "Act of God" flood, which the government's flood control
projects could not control, to be protected under § 702c as a flood or flood water101
Natural floods were determined to be those resulting from "unusual or extraordinary
climatic conditions" which inundated an area of the surface of the earth with water
where water ordinarily would not be expected to be.0 2 The government could also
prove the necessary "flood" if the climatic conditions were so unusual that a flood
was likely to occur t 3 Eventually, though, the circuit courts found this definition
to be too narrow, and thus contrary to the broad intent behind § 702c.1 4 Therefore,
97. See id. at 648 (arguing that the evidentiary difficulties created by the Fourth Circuit standard support
the "not wholly unrelated" standard as the correct one); see also Washington v. East Colum. Basin Irrigation Dist.,
105 F.3d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1997) (acknowledging that the circuit split over the proper standard was never
resolved in James).
98. See Stover v. United States, 204 F. Supp. 477,482-83 (N.D. Cal. 1962) (stating that the causation issue
did not depend on which part of the government's negligence had caused the damage, but rather depended on
whether the damage was caused at all by floods or flood waters).
99. Flood Control Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 702c (West 1989); see id. ("No liability of any kind shall attach to
or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place... "').
100. Guy F. Atkinson Co. v. Merritt, Chapman, & Scott Corp., 126 F. Supp. 406,409 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
101. See id. at 408 (finding that the purpose of § 702c was not to protect the government from liability for
everything which could be classified as a "flood," but rather to protect only those "Act of God" floods which the
government could not control); see also National Mfg. Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 263, 270 (8th Cir. 1954)
(expounding upon the legislative intent in including § 702c in the FCA, and referring to the devastation wreaked
by "Acts of God" floods and governmental inability to control them as a main concern behind the inclusion of §
702c).
102. Stover, 204 F. Supp. at 484; see also Guy F Atkinson, 126 F. Supp. at 409 (stating that the legislative
intent behind the immunity provision was to make sure the government would not be held liable for "Acts of God"
disasters which its flood control projects could not control; liability should not attach merely because the
government undertook the responsibility of trying to control future floods in some areas).
103. Stover, 204 F. Supp. at 484.
104. See Florida E. Coast Ry. Co. v. United States, 519 F.2d 1184, 1192 (5th Cir. 1975) (rejecting the
contention that the definition of "floods or flood waters" was limited only to "natural floods" after concluding that
Congress had intended the immunity provision to apply broadly, and therefore that the narrow definition was
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under this extended definition, § 702c was applied to protect the government from
liability for damage caused by both man-made and natural floods.'05 Again, both
types of floods must occur in connection with a flood control project to even reach
this question."'6
The courts extended the original definition because they found that requiring
the government to prove the flooding was natural rather than man-made
undermined the purpose of protecting the government from liabilities arising out
of its flood control activities.' 7 Under the "man-made" flooding definition, an
inundation of water caused by the negligent design, construction, operation, or
maintenance of a flood control project is protected by § 702c, provided that the
requisite nexus between the negligent conduct and the flood control activity
existed.'03 However, even under this extended definition, finding that the waters in
question were "floods or flood waters" still required proof that an inundation of
water or waters had caused the damage to the plaintiff. '09
IV. THE FORK IN THE STREAM: UNITED STATES V. JAMES
United States v. James"° was the first U. S. Supreme Court case to speak on the
issue of immunity under § 702c. Notably, the case was also the first time § 702c
contrary to such congressional intent).
105. See Burlison v. United States, 627 F.2d 119, 121 (8th Cir. 1980) (finding that a flood did not have to
be caused by "extraordinary climatic conditions" in order to fall under the protection of § 702c); Florida E. Coast
Ry., 519 F.2d at 1192 (holding, despite the fact that the water originated from a place where it was ordinarily
expected to be, that the phrase "floods and flood waters" included an "extraordinary rising of waters" caused by
constant rain falling in the channels of a flood control project, when the water overflowed the project walls,
damaging the plaintiff); Graci v. United States, 456 F.2d 20, 25 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that floods caused by
"flood control project[s] [that] had been negligently designed, constructed, operated, or maintained" were covered
under § 702c, as the requisite flood or flood waters); Stover, 332 F.2d 204, 208 (9th Cir. 1964) (affirming the
district court's application of § 702c to the facts of that case, but finding that the determination of the immunity
issue did not depend on a classification of the flood as a "natural" flood).
106. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text (explaining the necessity of a connection between the
flood and a federally funded flood control project).
107. See Aetna Ins. Co. v. United States, 628 F.2d 1201, 1204 (9th Cir. 1980) (explaining that requiring the
court to determine whether the flood had been "natural" or "man-made" would frustrate the purpose of § 702c and
would create too difficult a test for the court to apply, "lead[ing] the court[s] into the morass of 'contributing
causes,' 'superseding causes,' and 'intervening causes") (quoting Lunsford v. United States, 570 F.2d 221,229
n.13, which in turn quotes Lunsford v. United States, 418 F. Supp. 1045, 1054 (D. S.D. 1976)).
108. See Graci, 456 F.2d at 25 (asserting that "several courts have extended [§ 702c] immunity to bar suits
against the United States on the theory that a flood control project had been negligently designed, constructed,
operated, or maintained").
109. See Florida E. Coast Ry., 519 F.2d at 1192 (explaining that although the plaintiff's land was not
inundated by the water that had overflowed the federal project, the presence of those waters around the plaintiff's
property had caused the roadbed supporting the train tracks to erode and eventually wash out, and therefore,
because the damage was caused by the presence of flood waters, § 702c would apply). Also significant is the fact
that the court made a point of noting that the area in which the roadbed was located had been designated a flood
disaster area. Id.
110. 478 U.S. 597 (1986) [hereinafter James 111].
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was applied to immunize the government from liability for personal injury
damages."' Despite the opportunity for the Supreme Court to definitively settle any
questions about the proper scope of § 702c, the opinion left three issues unresolved.
First, the Court failed to resolve the pre-existing circuit split over the nexus issue,"
2
despite the fact that the adoption of a narrow nexus was the basis for the Fifth
Circuit decision." 3 Second, the Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's finding that the
words of § 702c were ambiguous and thus subject to interpretation, despite the fact
that the other circuits had freely interpreted those words differently from each other,
thereby illustrating the ambiguity." 4 Third, the Court's discussion regarding the
lack of ambiguity in the language of § 702c was so broad and ambiguous itself that
it has created a new split among the circuits over the definition of "floods and flood
waters.""
u5
A. Procedural and Factual Background
United States v. James"6 was a consolidation of two cases." 7 Both plaintiffs
brought wrongful death claims against the government, alleging that the negligence
of government employees caused the decedents to be swept through the retaining
structures of a federal dam and killed.18 Both decedents were recreational users of
a lake created by a federally funded dam which had flood control as one of its
purposes." 9 Furthermore, in both situations, the government employees of those
lakes had negligently failed to warn the decedents of the dangers from the current
which was caused by open flood control gates. 20
The district courts held that the immunity provision applied in both cases, and
therefore summarily dismissed the plaintiffs' cases for lack of jurisdiction.12' On
111. See James v. United States, 760 F.2d 590, 599 n.16 [hereinafter James 11] (explaining that out of the
23 appellate cases that had interpreted the immunity provision, 21 had dealt with property damage, and the other
two were resolved on different grounds).
112. See James III, 478 U.S. at 603-06 (citing Hayes and Morici Corp. in footnote 7 as if those cases agreed
with each other, and failing to acknowledge in footnote 4 that the circuits had already split regarding the proper
application of § 702c).
113. See id. at 602-03 (holding that the Fourth Circuit had utilized the correct test to determine when the
immunity applied, and adopting the same test for its analysis because that test "restricted the immunity more
closely to the limited purpose of the statute").
114. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text (illustrating why other courts must have found the
language ambiguous).
115. See infra Part ME (demonstrating how, because of the Supreme Court's United States v. James
opinion, the circuit courts now disagree over whether or not the definition of floods or flood waters includes water
which is merely contained in a flood control project).
116. 478 U.S. 597 (1986).
117. Id. at 597 (pre-opinion syllabus).
118. Id. (pre-opinion syllabus).
119. Id. (pre-opinion syllabus).
120. Id. (pre-opinion syllabus)..
121. Id. (pre-opinion syllabus).
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appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed both of the district court decisions.1 22 The Fifth
Circuit then reheard the appeal en banc and reversed itself, holding that the
immunity provision did not apply.'2 Upon appeal, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to review the decision.
124
B. The Fifth Circuit Adopts the Broad Nexus Test
In the first appellate decision, a Fifth Circuit panel used the two-part testt25 to
determine if the immunity provision applied.' 26 It adopted the Ninth Circuit broad
nexus standard to determine whether the conduct was connected to flood control, 127
requiring only that the negligent conduct be "not wholly unrelated" to any act of
Congress authorizing expenditures of federal funds for flood control. 128 Under this
standard, "the purpose of the project, rather than the purpose of the employee's
conduct, determines the government's immunity.' ' 29 Therefore, because the
government proved that one of the purposes of the project was flood control, the
court found that the requisite nexus between the project and the employee's conduct
had been met.
130
Next, the panel held that the damage was caused by the requisite "floods or
flood waters." It held that this element had been proven because the water in which
the decedents had drowned was in the public works project as a result of "flood
conditions." '13 This interpretation of § 702c "flood and flood waters," however, was
unprecedented, and not supported by the cases cited by the majority. In neither
122. James v. United States, 740 F2d 365 (5th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 760 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 578
U.S. 597 (1986) [hereinafter James 1].
123. James II, 760 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 478 U.S. 597 (1986).
124. James 11, 578 U.S. at 603.
125. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (explaining the elements of the two-part test).
126. James , 740 F.2d at 370 (finding that the negligence was connected to a federal project with flood
control as one of its purpose, and also that there was damage by flood waters).
127. See infra Part Ml.A.1 (discussing the broad nexus requirement).
128. See James , 740 F.2d at 369 (citing Florida East Coast Railway, 519 F.2d 1184,1191 (5th Cir. 1975),
as support for the proposition that the Fifth Circuit had adopted the "not wholly unrelated" standard). Ironically,
the Florida East Coast Railway case had only agreed with the first part of the Ninth Circuit standard-that
conduct "wholly unrelated" to a federal flood control project was not covered under the immunity provision.
Florida E. Coast Ry., 519 F2d at 1191.
129. See James 1, 740 F.2d at 369 (rejecting the Fourth Circuit standard from Hayes, which would not apply
the immunity if the employee's negligent conduct pertained to a recreational purpose rather than a flood control
purpose).
130. Id. at 369-70.
131. See id. at 370 n.3 (citing Aetna Insurance Co. v. United States, 628 F.2d 1201 (9th Cir. 1980), and
Burlison v. United States, 627 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1980), as support for the proposition that waters contained within
a flood control project qualify as "flood waters" as intended under the FCA).
132. See id. (defining the waters in question as the requisite "flood waters" merely because they were
contained in a public works project which had flood control as one of its purposes). The court extended the
definition even further when it held that the immunity does not depend on whether the damage was caused by
"floods or flood waters," and would apply to waters in a "placid lake on a summer day," as long as the damage
McGeorge Law Review / VoL 31
of the cases cited was the injury to the plaintiff caused while the water was still
contained in the flood control project.133 Rather, the damage in those cases was
caused when the waters which had been contained by a federal project escaped and
inundated the plaintiffs' land, either through the negligence of the government, or
because the project could not contain the flood waters.' 34 Those cases stood for the
proposition that "man-made" floods were protected under the immunity provision
just as were "natural" floods, not that waters within such a project are the requisite
"flood waters" merely because they are contained in a public works project.1 35
Despite the fact that its definition of "flood or flood waters" was unsupported,
and essentially combined the two elements into one, the first Fifth Circuit decision
held that both elements of the test had been met.136 Because the court found both
elements had been proven, it applied the protection of § 702c and affirmed the
dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims. 37 A rehearing was granted, however, and the
Fifth Circuit reversed itself en banc, disagreeing with the very analysis used to
determine whether the immunity applied.
138
was related to a public works project having flood control as one of its purposes. Id. at 370. This proposition is
unfounded and unsupported by any language of the statute or by any case interpreting the statute. See supra Part
1I.B (explaining the prior interpretations of "floods or flood waters").
133. See Aetna Ins. Co. v. United States, 628 F.2d 1201, 1204 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that when the Teton
Dam collapsed and flooded the plaintiff's downstream property, the result was a "flood" under § 702c, even
though the accident had been caused by government negligence). Although the court said that the level of water
being stored in the project was affected by rainfall, it merely did so to elucidate why it is too difficult to narrowly
define "floods" as only those caused by natural conditions: "any flood caused by government negligence is also
caused in part by natural conditions." Id. at 1204; see also Burlison v. United States, 627 F.2d 119, 121 (8th Cir.
1980) (holding that, for § 702c purposes, there is no difference between flooding "caused by unusual or
extraordinary climatic conditions," those caused by government negligence, and damage created by "back waters"
which inundate the plaintiffs property). Again, this case involved waters which overflowed their natural channels
because of a government flood control project which was negligently maintained or constructed, and did not
involve damage caused by waters contained in a channel. It. at 120. The waters became flood waters when they
left their channel, regardless of whether the cause was "man-made" or natural. Id. at 121.
134. Burlison, 627 F.2d at 121.
135. Id.
136. James 1, 740 F.2d at 370.
137. Id. at 373.
138. Id. at 374.
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C. The Fifth Circuit Reverses Itself. The Hayes Test Is the Proper Standard
When the Fifth Circuit reviewed the earlier holding en banc, it rejected the
proposition that conduct "not wholly unrelated" to a flood control project would be
immune.1 39 Instead, it adopted the Fourth Circuit's fact-sensitive analysis from
Hayes.t' However, before it addressed this issue, it had to justify the multiple
interpretations of the proper test for § 702c immunity by finding that the language
of § 702c was ambiguous.14 ' Thus, because the language of the statute was
ambiguous and could not be given its plain meaning, it was subject to interpretation,
and the court was free to adopt the interpretation it found most consistent with the
legislative intent of § 702c. 42 After reviewing the history and purpose of the statute,
the en banc decision found that the standard developed by the Fourth Circuit under
Hayes was the better standard because it was more closely related to the en banc's
interpretation of the history and purpose of § 702c.1
43
Under the Hayes test, the immunity provision would only apply if the
government had undertaken the conduct at issue specifically for a flood control
purpose."t4 The Fifth Circuit looked to the facts of each case to decide if the conduct
at issue was specifically related to the negligent employee's flood control duties,
rather than the employee's recreational duties. 45 After reviewing the specific facts
of each case, the court found that the summary judgments against the plaintiffs were
improper because the damage was or could have been caused by the employees'
failure to warn recreational users of known dangers on the lake. 146 Therefore, its
conduct was not protected under § 702c. 47
As for the second element-whether "flood or flood waters" caused the injury
to the plaintiff-the court assumed, without actually dediding, that this element had
been proven.'4 Proof was unnecessary because the court's decision rested on the
139. See James 11, 760 F.2d 590, 601 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding that the broad interpretation taken by National
Manufacturing and subsequent cases does not fit with the legislative intent behind § 702c),
140. See id. at 602-03 (holding that the narrow Fourth Circuit nexus standard was more consistent with
legislative intent, and therefore adopting it as the proper standard); see also supra Part If.A.2 (explaining the
Hayes case and its nexus requirement).
141. See James 11, 760 F.2d at 593-94 (explaining that although the starting point was the language of the
statute itself, the court was justified in using the history and purpose of the statute to interpret the statute's scope
because of the latent ambiguities in its language).
142. "Our duty is to find that interpretation which can most fairly be said to be embedded in the statute, in
the sense of being most harmonious with its scheme and with the general purposes that Congress manifested." Id.
at 596 (internal quotation marks omitted).
143. Id. at 602.
144. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text (discussing the analysis under the Fourth Circuit test).
145. James 11, 760 F.2d at 603.
146. Id.
147. l
148. See id. at 594 n.6 (suggesting that "flood waters" is an ambiguous term and subject to many definitions,
such as "waters that are out of control" or "water at a flood control project," but refusing to adopt either
definition).
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finding that the requisite connection to a flood control project had not been
shown.'49 The court merely assumed that "flood waters" existed under these facts
so as to facilitate part of its argument that the language of the immunity provision
was ambiguous and therefore open to multiple interpretations. 5
The Fifth Circuit believed that applying the immunity provision to these facts
would be contrary to legislative intent because "Congress had not intended 'to
shield the negligent or wrongful acts of government employees-either in the
construction or in the continued operation' of flood control projects, including the
failure 'to warn the public of the existence of hazards to their accepted use of
government-impounded water, or nearby land." 51 It would also create an unjust
"absolute immunity where there would otherwise be liability under the [FTCA] for
personal injury resulting from government employees' negligent failure to warn of
government-created hazards to known recreational users.' 52 Apparently, it was the
Fifth Circuit's holding that the plain language of the provision was ambiguous that
got the attention of the Supreme Court.
t53
D. What Did the Supreme Court Hold?
1. The Court Failed to Acknowledge the Nexus Split Created by Hayes and
Adopted by the Fifth Circuit
According to the Supreme Court, before the Fifth Circuitreversed itself and
refused to grant the government immunity, all other appellate courts would have
agreed that the protection of § 702c applied to the facts of James. 54 That
assumption, however, completely ignored the split created by the Fourth Circuit
opinion in Hayes.155 In fact, in a footnote, the Court cited Hayes and Morici Corp.
149. See id. at 603-04 (concluding that the immunity does not attach where the fault was the result of
employee failure to warn recreational users of the "accepted use of government-impounded water").
150. See id. at 593-96 (listing the interpretive ambiguities arising from the language of the provision in order
to justify looking to the legislative history of the provision for the correct interpretation).
151. James III, 478 U.S. 597, 603 (1986) (citation omitted) (quoting James 11, 760 F.2d 590, 599, 603 (5th
Cir. 1985)).
152. James 11, 760 F.2d at 592; see id. (stating the issue as whether or not the creation of such an absolute
immunity had been the intention of the framers of the FCA § 702c immunity provision).
153. See infra Part IV.D.2 (explaining that the focus of the Supreme Court opinion in James III was on
whether or not the language of § 702c was ambiguous).
154. "All other Courts of Appeals that have interpreted § 702c-and, prior to this case, the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit... have held that § 702c grants immunity to the Federal Government from damages caused
by flood[ ]waters from a flood control project." James 111, 478 U.S. at 603-04 n.4.
155. See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing the split created when the Fourth Circuitrefused to uphold the district
court's application of the immunity).
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v. United States 56 as if they were consistent with each other."7 Given this failure
to even acknowledge the split, it is inconceivable that the Court resolved the
conflict, favoring one nexus standard over another, as has been claimed by some
circuit courts. 58 Although the Court did address a claim raised by the respondents
that the negligent conduct was "wholly unrelated" to flood control-which sounds
like they were trying to make a Hayes-type argument-the wholly unrelated
standard is distinct from the nexus requirement. 159 The Hayes court disagreed with
the other circuit courts over the nexus issue, not the "wholly unrelated" standard. 160
Hence, despite the holding that a negligent failure to warn was part of the
management of a flood control project, it was not favoring the Hayes standard over
the broad standard; rather, it was illustrating that a connection existed between the
conduct and flood control.16' It did not analyze the nature of that connection, as
would be required under the tight nexus standard. 62
Finally, although the Court held that the suction created by the release of the
waters to prevent flooding was a cause of the decedents' death, 63 this again raised
a nexus issue which the Court failed to answer. The release of water for flood
control was merely a cause; a more substantial factor was the negligent and willful
failure of the government employees to warn the recreational users of that danger.'64
The decedents would not have been using the waters for recreational purposes in
that area if the employees had done their jobs and provided the necessary warnings.
156. 681 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1982) (adopting a broad nexus standard).
157. See James 111, 478 U.S. at 605 n.7 (citing the Hayes standard, which would not grant immunity merely
by finding that the project has flood control as one of its purposes, as if it were consistent with the Morici Corp.
decision, which held that the government is not liable for damage caused by flood waters at a federal public works
project not wholly unrelated to flood control).
158. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 881 F2d 895, 900 (10th Cir. 1989) (criticizing the Ninth Circuit for
continuing to use its "not wholly unrelated" nexus standard despite the James 111 opinion which, according to the
Boyd court, adopted the more fact-sensitive nexus determination of Hayes).
159. See supra text accompanying notes 75-77 (explaining how the "wholly unrelated" test and the nexus
requirement are actually two different standards: the wholly unrelated test assumes that the flood had no
connection with a federally funded flood control project, whereas the nexus requirement assumes such a
connection exists). The Hayes court disagreed with the Morici Corp. court over how much of a connection is
needed to satisfy the nexus requirement.
160. Supra text accompanying notes 87-89.
161. James 111, 478 U.S. at 610. Again, the split over the requisite nexus was never even acknowledged, so
how could the Court be favoring one over the other? The Court was merely responding to a claim made by the
respondents, who, unfortunately, confused the issues. See generally Washington v. East Colum. Basin Irrigation
Dist. v. United States, 105 .3d 517,519 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining that the broad nexus standard was still
good law in that circuit regardless of the claim that James had adopted the Hayes standard, because "the issue was
neither presented nor decided in James').
162. See supra llI.A.2 (discussing the fact-sensitive determination of Hayes to determine whether enough
of a connection had existed between the flood damage and an anti-flooding activity).
163. James 111, 478 U.S. at 599-601.
164. It is this type of multiple and intervening cause problem which the Hayes standard attempted to solve
by demanding a fact-sensitive test to determine whether an anti-flooding activity was the cause of the damage.
See supra Part Ill.A.2 (discussing the fact-sensitive determination of Hayes).
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This cause, and how it relates to the nexus issue, was never addressed by the
Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court opinion focused instead on the Fifth Circuit's en banc
holding that the language of § 702c is ambiguous.l16 The en banc decision was not
the first to have found ambiguities in the language of § 702c, as evidenced by the
various interpretations of the different parts of the provision. 66 The Fifth Circuit
merely illustrated § 702c's potential ambiguities. However, instead of attempting
an interpretation based solely on the ambiguous text of § 702c, the Fifth Circuit
used the statute's ambiguity to justify its use of legislative history to define the
scope of the provision-it did this to achieve an interpretation that differed from the
panel's but which was consistent with Hayes.'67
2. The Supreme Court Holds that the Language of § 702c Is Not Ambiguous
The main thrust of the James majority opinion was its overruling of the Fifth
Circuit's en banc holding that the language of § 702c is ambiguous. The Supreme
Court not only held that the language is unambiguous and therefore must be given
its plain meaning, but then went on to use legislative history to support the "plain
meaning" the court had attached to the words. 68 Most of the controversy over
whether or not the language is ambiguous was centered on the meaning of
"damage."' 69 The Court overruled the Fifth Circuit en banc ruling that damage
could refer to only property damage, only personal injury damage, or both. 70 Rather
than siding with the en banc opinion, the Supreme Court held that the ordinary
165. James 111, 478 U.S. at 604-12.
166. See supraPartI (discussing the differing interpretations of"floods and floodwaters" and the differing
nexus requirements of the circuits). This disagreement among the circuits began with Peterson v. United States,
367 F.2d 271 (9th Cir. 1966), which held that a flood "wholly unrelated" to a flood control project is not protected
under § 702c, in contrast to the earlier holding in National Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 263 (8th
Cir. 1954), that the immunity applied notwithstanding any federal flood control project. Supra notes 66-67 and
accompanying text.
167. See James 11, 760 F.2d 590,594-96 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding that the latent ambiguities in the language
of the provision justified the court's use of legislative history to develop the proper scope of that ambiguous
provision).
168. James 11I, 478 U.S. at 604-06. The James III court credited the Fifth Circuit en banc holding as being
the first court opinion to hold that no immunity attached when damages were caused by flood water from a flood
control project, and, not acknowledging the split previously created by the Fourth Circuit in Hayes, the Court
assumed that all courts would agree that these facts presented the requisite connection to flood control and that
these were flood waters. Id. at 603-04 n.4.
169. See generally id. at 614-16 (StevensJ., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's construction of"damage"
to apply to personal injury, because the majority had used the word "damages" rather than "damage" (without an
"s"), which Justice Stevens saw as significant because, historically, "damage" referred only to property damage.
Furthermore, the dissent opined that § 702c must be read in connection with the proviso which deals with
"takings," a property issue, and thus the section was intended only to immunize the government from liability for
property damage caused by flooding.); Juvan, supra note 27, at 306-07,316 (suggesting that the real intent behind
§ 702c was to immunize the government from property damage only).
170. James 111, 478 U.S. at 605.
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meaning of the word must include both property and personal injury damages 71
The Fifth Circuit had also held that the phrase "flood and flood waters" was
ambiguous. 17 2 Again, the Supreme Court overruled that portion of the opinion, and
held that the plain language of § 702c made clear that "flood and flood waters"
referred to "all waters contained in or carried through a federal flood control project
for purposes of or related to flood control, as well as to waters that such projects
cannot control."' 73 It is this broad definition of "floods and flood waters" that has
led to a new disagreement over the proper scope of § 702c.174
3. Overly Broad Language and Ambiguities in the Opinion
The Court held that the meaning of "flood waters" was not ambiguous.175 In
doing so, it assumed that all waters contained in a public works project which has
flood control as one of its purposes are "flood waters" within the meaning of
§ 702c. 76 Thus, taken out of context, that assumption could mean that if water
within a public works project were to play a role in causing damage to a plaintiff,
the government could claim immunity for any liability under § 702c. On the other
hand, whether or not the Court intended such a broad interpretation is uncertain,
because the Court noted in the corresponding footnote, and continuously throughout
the opinion, that the waters in question were at "flood stage" and were being
released for flood control purposes. 
178
171. See id. (explaining that "[d]amages 'have historically been awarded both for injury to property and
injury to the person"' (quoting American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446, 450 (1947), and citing
Webster's Third New International Dictionary and Black's Law Dictionary as support for the broad definition of
damage)).
172. See James H1, 760 F.2d at 594 n.6 (finding that multiple definitions could be attached to "flood waters"
as used in the statute); see also id. at 596 (describing another ambiguity caused by the use of the phrase "flood
water": it could be read to immunize the government from liability when the flood water is only an incidental
condition to the governmental fault--e.g., an air traffic controller negligently causes a plane to crash into a flood
control lake).
173. James 111, 478 U.S. at 605.
174. See infra Part 1V.E (discussing the disagreement between the circuits post-James III over whether that
language is limited by the fact that the Supreme Court had already found the waters within those projects to be
at flood stage, or whether water in a project with flood control as a purpose is considered "flood water" at all
times, regardless of whether it is at "flood stage" or is released for flood control purposes).
175. James 111, 478 U.S. at 605.
176. See id. (stating in broad language that "the terms 'flood' and 'flood waters' apply to all waters
contained in or carried through a federal flood control project for purposes of or related to flood control, as well
as to waters that such projects cannot control," thereby condensing the two issues into one).
177. See Reese v. South Fla. Water Management Dist., 59 F.3d 1128, 1130 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that
even if the water had been released "solely for" irrigation or other purposes, it was still the requisite "flood water,"
because the clear holding of James III was that if the water was contained in a federal project which has flood
control as one of its purposes, it is "flood water").
178. See James 11, 478 U.S. at 605 n.7 (noting that the district court had found that the waters were released
to prevent flooding (if it is preventing flooding, meaning there has been no flood, how can they be flood
waters?!)); id. at 612 (finding that the gates had been opened to control flooding, and holding that the waters must
be in the project "for purposes of flood control or related to flood control").
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Notably, even if the Court intended to define flood waters as merely waters
contained in a flood control project at flood stage-which is merely a measure of
the level of water currently contained in the project, and not a determination that a
flood is occurring-that is the same definition offered by the Fifth Circuit decision,
which was unsupported by precedent or legislative history.179 Similarly, the cases
cited by the Supreme Court as support for that definition never dealt with waters
that had been contained in the flood control project, but rather dealt only with
waters that escaped or were uncontrolled by such a project.8 ° This uncertainty over
the Court's use of such broad language is the basis of a new disagreement between
the circuits: a disagreement over the proper interpretation of the Supreme Court
holding.18 1 If the Court did intend such a broad definition, the inequity created
becomes obvious. Under that definition, if a family were swimming in a lake
created by a federal flood control project and a government plane negligently
crashed into the lake, killing the family, § 702c immunity would apply because (1)
the waters would be considered flood waters, and (2) a connection would have
existed between the flood waters and the deaths (i.e., the family would not have
been killed in the lake but for swimming in those waters).
E. The Scope of the Immunity Provision After James
United States v. James8 2 failed to develop a consistent approach to the
application of the immunity provision.' Not only did James fall to resolve the pre-
existing circuit split over the required nexus, but the subsequent circuit court
interpretations of the James opinion have led to an even wider chasm between the
circufts over the proper standard for determining the applicability of § 702c.'8
4
Some of the circuits assert that the Supreme Court adopted the "not wholly
179. See supra Part IV.D.3 (illustrating how the broad definition given to "flood waters" is unsupported by
precedent and legislative history); see also supra Part 11.A (discussing the legislative history behind the passage
of § 702c).
180. See James 111, 478 U.S. at 605 n.7 (citing Morici Corp. and Hayes, neither of which dealt with damage
caused while the waters were still contained in a federal project which had flood control as one of its purposes).
181. See infra Part ME (discussing the disagreement between the circuits over the proper interpretation of
that broad language).
182. 478 U.S. 597 (1986).
183. See, e.g., Hiersche v. United States, 503 U.S. 925,923 (1992), denying cert. to 933 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir.
1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to the continuing conflict between the circuit courts over the proper
application of the immunity provision despite the Supreme Court's opinion in James 111).
184. See generally Washington v. United States, 105 F.3d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing the continued
split between the Ninth Circuit nexus requirement and the Fourth Circuit nexus requirement); Cantrell v. United
States, 89 F.3d 268, 271-73 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing the conflicting circuit court standards for determining the
requisite nexus, and explaining its reason for adopting a totally different standard); Fryman v. United States, 901
F.2d 79, 82 (7th Cir. 1990) (declining to adopt either of the pre-James II nexus standards, but rather creating its
own standard to decide whether the necessary connection has been shown).
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unrelated" standard. to Others argue that the split over the requisite nexus standard
was not resolved under James because it was never even raised. 86 Another group
of circuit courts has found that the holding of James was too ambiguous and
confusing to apply literally, so they have developed their own nexus standards.'
87
Furthermore, the broad language used in James to define "flood waters" created
a new split among the circuits.' 88 Some circuits now hold that all waters contained
within a public works project which has flood control as one of its purposes are
"flood waters" for § 702c purposes. 89 Other circuits recognize, though, that despite
185. See Reese v. South Fla. Water Management Dist., 59 F.3d 1128, 1129 (11th Cir. 1995) (relying on
James III for the proposition that the immunity provision applies regardless of whether flood control was the
specific use of the project when the damage occurred); Dawson v. United States, 894 F.2d 70,73-74 (3d Cir. 1990)
(finding that James III requires the immunity provision to apply unless the conduct causing injury is "wholly
unrelated" to a flood control project); McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558,561 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that
"in light of James," its pre-James 1i holding from Morici Corp. applied, and immunity attached as long as the
conduct is related to a project which has flood control as one of its purposes).
186. See Washington, 105 F.3d at 519 n.3 (stating that the court was free to use the "not wholly unrelated"
standard developed pre-James II1 because the "issue was neither presented nor decided in James [I11]").
187. See Cantrell, 89 F.3d at 270-72 (holding that James Ifi never defined the requisite nexus and
developing a standard under which the focus is on the causal connection between the alleged tortious act and the
injury caused, which standard the court states is consistent with the outcome in James 111); Fryman, 901 F.2d at
81 (finding that James Ill held that there was no liability for damage connected to the management of a project
having flood control as one of its purposes, but that this holding was "so broadly written that it could" not be
applied literally," because a literal application would protect the government from damage caused when a "tree-
trimmer's car... careenled] through some picnickers [at a flood control project]); see also Boyd v. United States,
881 F.2d 895, 900 (10th Cir. 1989) (stating that despite the Ninth Circuit's continued adherence to the "not wholly
unrelated" standard, James 111 did not require such a broad standard to be used, nor was the standard consistent
with Congress' intent when it adopted the immunity provision, and moreover, that the requisite nexus had not been
met under its facts).
188. Compare Washington, 105 F.3d at 519 (citing James 111 for the proposition that "all waters contained
in or carried through a federal flood control project for purposes of or related to flood control ... [are] considered
'flood waters' if [they are] part of the project," regardless of whether the waters are merely within the project or
are actually waters the project cannot control), andReese, 59 F.3d at 1130 (stating that all waters contained within
a multi-purpose federal flood control project were "flood waters" for immunity purposes, regardless of whether
those waters were released "solely for" or "only for" irrigation or other purposes, because "periodic release of
water is fundamental to the operation ofa flood control project"), andZavadil v. United States, 908 F.2d 334,335-
36 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that because the water was contained within a multi-purpose federal flood control
project and was "being monitored for flood control and navigational purposes," it was "flood waters" as defined
in James III for immunity purposes), with Boyd, 881 F.2d at 900 (stating that the Ninth Circuit had misconstrued
the broad language used by James III to define "flood waters" because it failed to recognize that the Court had
noted more than once that the waters were, at the time of the injury, being released for flood control and,
furthermore, that the Court had specifically limited the broad language when it cited Hayes while defining flood
waters for the proposition that the immunity would not apply if the water was being used for non-flood control
purposes).
189. See Reese, 59 F.3d at 1130 ("James [I11] clearly held that all water in a federal flood control project
is considered 'flood water' if it is part of the project); McCarthy, 850 F.2d at 560-61 (declaring that James Ill held
that "all waters contained in or carried through a federal flood control project for purposes of or related to flood
control, as well as to waters that such projects cannot control," are "flood waters" (quoting James 111, 478 U.S.
597, 605 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted))); see also Fryman, 901 F.2d at 80-81 (agreeing that, under
James III, "every drop of water" within any public works project having flood control as one purpose will be
"flood water," but criticizing the James opinion as "too broad to apply literally').
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the broad language in the main text of the opinion, the Supreme Court did note that
the waters within the project were at "flood stage" and were being released in order
to prevent flooding."tg
Today, the circuit courts are consistently inconsistent with each other with
regards to when the immunity provision will apply and when it will not.' 9' Alleging
the same set of facts, a plaintiff could be barred from one circuit court due to the
immunity provision, yet get redress despite the provision in another circuit court.
92
The inequities created by the use of the immunity provision in general and the
unfortunate decision in James has even been criticized by one of the Supreme
Court's own. 93
V. THE FTCA AND THE FCA: WERE THEY NOT
MEANT TO WORK TOGETHER?
A. Should the Judiciary Have Decided So Summarily that § 702c Was Not
Repealed by the FTCA?
The FTCA was originally enacted'94 as part of the Legislative Reorganization
Act of 1946.'95 Section 424 of that original Act contained language suggesting that
it was repealing the immunity provision found in the 1928 FCA. Before
codification, § 424(b) provided:
[Aill provisions of law authorizing any Federal agency to consider,
ascertain, adjust, or determine claims on account of damage to or loss of
property, or on account of personal injury or death, caused by the negligent
or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while
acting within the scope of his office or employment are hereby repealed in
190. See Boyd, 881 F.2d at 900 (criticizing the Ninth Circuit's failure in McCarthy to recognize the limits
the Supreme Court had put on its definition of "flood waters" when it noted that the waters were at "flood stage"
and were being released in order to prevent flooding).
191. Compare id. (holding that plaintiff whose husband was killed after being run over by a boat while he
was snorkeling in an area of an unmarked federally funded lake was not barred by § 702c from bringing a claim
against the government), and Fryman, 901 F.2d at 81-82 (holding that plaintiff who became quadriplegic after
diving into an unmarked shallow area of a lake created by a federally funded flood control project was barred by
§ 702c from bringing suit), with McCarthy, 850 F.2d at 561, 563 (holding that plaintiff who was rendered
quadriplegic after diving off a wind-surf board into an area of a lake created by an improperly marked federal
flood control project was barred from bringing a claim because of protections afforded the government by § 702c).
192. See Hiersche, 503 U.S. at 925 (theorizing that if the case had arisen in a different circuit, the plaintiff
would have withstood the summary judgment motion, because a different circuit would not have applied the
immunity provision under those facts).
193. Justice Stevens called the James III decision unfortunate. d at 925 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
194. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24 (1953).
195. Legislative Reorganization Act, ch. 753, §§ 401-424, 424(b) (1946) (current version at 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 2671-2680 (Vest 1994)).
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respect of claims cognizable under part two of this title... , including but
without limitation, the [following] provisions .... t96
The Act then expressly listed several laws which were repealed by the FTCA, while
providing that the list was not exclusive. 97 However, when the FTCA was codified
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680, it did not include that language because it was "not
properly a part of a code of general and permanent law."' 98
Despite that language, in National Manufacturing Co. v. United States,'99 the
Eighth Circuit held that the FTCA did not repeal, explicitly or implicitly, the FCA,
and therefore § 702c was still a valid waiver of liability.20° However, the Eighth
Circuit ignored, as have all subsequent courts which cite National Manufacturing
for the proposition that the FTCA did not repeal § 702c, the "including but without
limitation" language of § 425(b) of the Legislative Reorganization Act because that
language was not codified with the rest of the Act.20 On the other hand, those same
courts did use the list of statutes which had been expressly repealed by the FTCA
to imply that if Congress had meant to repeal § 702c, it would have listed the FCA
expressly, even though that list was not codified either.2°2 Furthermore, despite this
evidence that the FTCA repealed § 702c by implication, courts refuse to recognize
that implication because of the amount of precedent holding that the section was not
repealed.2 3 However, if the judiciary wrongly interpreted the FTCA as failing to
repeal § 702c by implication, is it not its duty to correct that mistake?
B. The Discretionary Function Exception: Was It Meant to Take the Place of
§ 702c?
While the enactment of the FTCA symbolized congressional recognition that
the government should be liable for its own wrongs, Congress was concerned that




199. 210 E2d 263 (8th Cir. 1954).
200. Id. at 274.
201. See id. (explaining that the Act repealed certain statutes expressly, and because the FCA was not among
those statutes, the court would not assume that Congress had meant to repeal the FCA by implication).
202. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680 (West 1994), Historical and Revision Notes (stating that § 424(b) of the
Legislative Reorganization Act had not been codified); see also Florida E. Coast Ry. Co. v. United States, 519
F.2d 1184, 1191-92 (5th Cir. 1975) (explaining that the Act contained a list of statutes which were expressly
repealed, but also omitting the fact that the list was described as merely illustrative); Graci v. United States, 456
F.2d 20, 24 (5th Cir. 1971) (citing the list of statutes which were repealed, but failing to mention the fact that the
list was described as merely illustrious).
203. "After 26 years of consistent interpretation, it would be the proper function of Congress and not this
Court to narrow the scope of the immunity." Aetna Ins. Co. v. United States, 628 F.2d 1201, 1204 (9th Cir. 1980).
204. David S. Fishback & Gail Killefer, The Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims
Act: Dalehite to Varig to Berkowitz, 25 IDAHO L. REv. 291, 293 (1988).
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Congress feared this burden would get in the way of performing necessary
governmental functions and using its necessary decision-making authority.
25
Congress addressed these fears by including the discretionary function exception
in the FTCA.2t 6 It was viewed as a "highly important exception.' 2°
The discretionary function exception has been interpreted by the Supreme Court
to protect the "discretion of the executive or the administrator to act according to
one's judgment of the best course."208 Although the courts acknowledge it is
impossible to define where the protected discretion begins and ends, they have
listed several factors used to determine whether the necessary discretion was
involved, including, for example: "the nature of the conduct, rather than the status
of the actor"; and whether the government was "acting in its role as a regulator of
the conduct of private individuals." 2 9 Moreover, "[w]here there [was] room for
policy judgment and decision" in the negligent act, then the act was discretionary
in nature and therefore not subject to suit under the FTCA.1 °
Significantly, there is recorded legislative history of the debate over the
discretionary function exception which suggests the drafters of the FTCA intended
discretionary decisions in the context of flood control to be included under that
exception. During the debate, Congress adopted the Attorney General's
characterization of the purpose of the discretionary function exception. 21 The
Attorney General described the exception as:
intend[ing] to preclude any possibility that the bill might be construed to
authorize suit for damages against the Government growing out of
authorized activity, such as a flood control or irrigation project, where no
negligence on the part of any Government agent is shown, and the only
ground for the suit is the contention that the same conduct by a private
individual would be tortious.
212
205. See id. at 293-94 (stating that the discretionary function exception grew out of congressional fears that
waiving sovereign immunity would "interfere with governmental operations and decision-making," and
furthermore that a complete waiver may present a violation of the separation of powers doctrine).
206.
The provisions of this chapter... shall not apply to-(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of
an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation,
whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an
employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
28 U.S.C.A. § 2680 (West 1984) (paragraph structuring omitted).
207. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 30 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 77-2245, at 10 (1942)).
208. Id. at 34.
209. United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacoa Aerea Rio Grandense, 467 U.S. 797, 813 (1984).
210. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 36.
211. Id. at 30.
212. M
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This specific mention of flood control suggests that Congress intended § 702c to be
repealed, because the discretionary function exception would provide the necessary
protection from the massive amount of liability which could otherwise attach in the
face of federal anti-flooding discretionary decisions.
The discretionary function exception can provide the necessary protection for
the decisions made by the government during its anti-flooding activities.2 3 In fact,
there is case law that analyzes a claim for negligently inflicted flood water damage
under the FTCA, and that applies the discretionary function exception to the
situation.214 In these cases, the discretionary function exception provided the same
liability protection for governmental anti-flooding activities as the 1928 Congress
intended to provide by enacting the immunity provision in § 702c.2"5 Therefore, if
the discretionary function exception were allowed to do its job in the realm of flood
control, as was contemplated by the framers of the exception,21 6 § 702c would no
longer be necessary. Allowing the discretionary function exception to provide
protection for governmental anti-flooding activities renders thejudicial justification
for modem recognition of § 702c moot.
Using the discretionary function exception to provide the necessary immunity
would also eliminate the inequities created by the modem application of § 702c. It
would only be the type of claims raised in cases like James which would be able to
proceed under the FTCA, because no discretion was involved in those decisions not
to warn people about or mark dangerous areas.217 Moreover, it is the James-type
213. Infra note 215 and accompanying text.
214. See Spillway Marina, Inc. v. United States, 445 F.2d 876, 878 (10th Cir. 1971) (ruling that the
discretionary function exception immunized the government from liability for damage to plaintiff's marina caused
by a release of water from a federal flood control project); W.R. Cooley v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 385, 387
(D.S.D. 1959) (holding that the plaintiff's claim for damages to his property after the construction of a federal dam
and reservoir caused water to inundate his land was barred due to the discretionary function exception); Thomas
v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 881, 882 (W.D. Mo. 1949) (ruling that the plaintiff's claim for water damage caused
by the building of a federal navigational project on the Missouri river was barred due to the discretionary function
exception).
215. See Spillway Marina, 445 F. 2d at 878 (finding that government was not liable for flood damage
caused, despite its anti-flooding activities, due to the discretionary function exception). The 1928 Congress was
concerned that flooding would still occur despite the government's flood control activities. Congress did not want
the government to be liable for the damage that such floods may cause merely because of the federal government's
anti-flooding activities. Supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
216. Supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
217. See generally Cantrell v. United States, 89 F.3d 268,274 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding that the FCA did not
bar the plaintiff's claim for personal injury damages after a boat crashed on waters contained in a federal flood
control project, and holding that the claim was better resolved under FTCA doctrines); Boyd v. United States, 881
F.2d 895, 898-900 (10th Cir. 1989) (ruling that neither the FCA nor the discretionary function exception to the
FTCA barred the plaintiffs claim for personal injuries caused by the government's failure to warn recreational
users of known dangers); Denham v. United States, 834 F.2d 518, 520-22, 523 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that the
discretionary function exception did not bar the plaintiffs claim for personal injuries resulting from a dive into
an improperly marked federally funded lake); Lindgren v. United States, 665 F.2d 978, 981-83 (9th Cir. 1982)
(finding that the discretionary function exception did not apply per se to the plaintiff's FTCA claim for injuries
sustained when his water ski struck a river bottom in an area where there was no "shallow water" warning for
recreational users).
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plaintiffs who need the ability to get private relief. In the normal flooding situation,
Congress usually passes emergency relief bills to fund disaster recovery, thus
providing remedies for victims of true floods.218 The plaintiffs in James and similar
cases cannot recover under such emergency relief bills, as they were not injured by
a flood.219 Further, these emergency relief bills justify the original congressional
decision to deny private indemnity for true flood damages; those injured still get
public relief, and the government does not go bankrupt from thousands of private
claims.
220
Not allowing civil recovery in a James situation not only creates a huge
inequity for that particular plaintiff, but it does nothing to further governmental
anti-flooding activities. Such limited individual liability does not create the massive
liability that the 1928 Congress feared would discourage the government from
funding future flood control projects; therefore, in those types of situations, there
is no reason for invoking the protection of § 702c.22' Despite all of the above, the
courts have held that because the FTCA did not expressly waive § 702c, courts may
not infer that Congress meant to waive § 702c "by implication," because sovereign
immunity must be specifically waived.222
VI. CONCLUSION
Section 702c is an antiquated statute which has become an engine of injustice
in today's world. Instead of protecting the government from the prospect of massive
liability due to the federal government's anti-flooding activities, the statute protects
reckless and negligent conduct by government employees.223 Furthermore, judicial
interpretation of that provision has been so inconsistent, and has been broadened so
much, that it has immunized the government against liability for tortious conduct
that the provision was never intended to protect.224 In order to rectify this situation,
Congress should act and make clear that the FTCA was intended to repeal § 702c,
218. See Fryman v. United States, 901 F.2d 79,80(7th Cir. 1990) (explaining that Congress regularly enacts
legislation which provides billions of dollars in relief funds for victims of floods).
219. "Congress does not pass special legislation to assist individuals who suffer personal injury in flood-
control waters as a result of Government negligence." Hiersche v. United States, 503 U.S. 923, 924 n.2 (1992).
220. See generally National Mfg. Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 263, 272 n.3 (8th Cir. 1954) (explaining
that, on numerous occasions, Congress has declined to depart from providing relief through emergency relief bills,
and has refused to adopt an indemnification program for flood victims because of the massive amount of liability
that the government would incur under such a program).
221. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text (discussing the policy for providing immunity under
§ 702c).
222. See Florida E. Coast Ry. Co. v. United States, 519 F.2d 1184, 1192 (5th Cir. 1975) (explain~ing that
the court will not assume that Congress intended to repeal the statute by implication); Graci v. United States, 456
F.2d 20, 24 (5th Cir. 1971) (invoking the statutory construction principle "that repeals by implication are not
favored").
223. Supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
224. Supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
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and that the discretionary function exception will provide the necessary protection
for anti-flooding decisions.
In the absence of such congressional action, the Supreme Court should
narrowly interpret the requisite nexus between the "flood and flood waters" and a
flood control project. By narrowly defining the nexus, the Supreme Court can
reduce the gross inequity created by modem interpretations of § 702c immunity.22
A narrow interpretation will not only provide a consistent standard for determining
when the provision applies, thus solving the disagreement among the circuits, but
it will also limit the application of § 702c to those situations in which concern over
government involvement in flood control is implicated.
225. See supra Part ME (exposing the inequities created by conflicting circuit court applications of § 702c
after the Supreme Court's decision in James 111).
